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tChapter 13
RecentLiberalization Episodes
Insection 1.4 the major features of three recent attempts at stabilization plus
liberalization were outlined: the Ibañez-Klein program of 1956—58, the Ales-
sandri program of 1959—6 1, and the Frei program of 1965—70. Details of each
program were given in Part II of this book, and the impact of each on price-
related measures was analyzed there. In Part III the consequences of the
programs were explored for five major areas of macroeconomic policy.
In this final part, the three liberalization episodes are taken up again, with
the focus of the analysis on four questions: Why were the liberalization efforts
made? What was done? What were the short-run effects? Why did they fail?
Four major conclusions are drawn from this analysis.
i. The central objective in each case was not liberalization of the foreign
sector. The change in the international economic regime was but part of an
over-all stabilization effort. The primary objectives were to arrest inflation and
end stagnation. The international economic situation was an important con-
tributing factor, but less significant than the domestic issues.
ii. The limited degree of short-run success in regard to these and other
concerns substantially weakened the foreign-sector liberalization attempts.
Without such success, political momentum could not be maintained sufficiently
long to reap the potential long-run advantages noted in Part III above.
iii. In all three efforts, even under the sliding-peg exchange-rate policy,
the PLD-EER was kept substantially below equilibrium and was allowed to
decline. The boom in the copper market in the late 1960s enabled the Frei
government to follow such a NER policy without encountering major foreign-
exchange shortages. The two earlier programs were not so successful in relation
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to the world copper market. The attempt to maintain a below-equilibrium and
declining price for foreign exchange, therefore, resulted in severe foreign-
exchange shortages.
iv. A gradual approach to stabilization and liberalization has the advan-
tage of not strongly disrupting the economic-political system. Some short-run
successes may be scored in order to maintain momentum.
For Chile, the last point is highly pertinent. Given the failure of four major
stabilization efforts and three major liberalization attempts in less than two
decades, however, a gradual approach is not likely to be very credible there.1 If
it is not credible, changes will not occur to enable Chile to reap longer-run
advantages. Instead, resources will be devoted to protecting vested interests
from the transitory lessening of restrictions. Under such conditions it would
be very hard to have enough short-run successes to maintain political momen-
tum for a gradual approach even though long-run changes are not evident.
The best hope for gaining the long-run benefits from liberalization, there-
fore, may be by an abrupt transformation of policy.2 The short-run costs may
be large (and may be mitigated in part by appropriate policies). But only such
an attempt may make the whole effort credible and thus change expectations
sufficiently quickly so that the long-run advantages begin to appear before all
political momentum is lost.
13.1 MOTIVATIONS FOR LIBERALIZATION
EFFORTS
Both external and internal factors entered into the decisions to initiate liberal-
ization programs. Table 13.1 includes some indicators of these factors for
the year immediately preceding each program as well as for its first and last
year of operation.
13.1.1External Factors.
Three aspects of the external situation are of primary interest: the role of
pressure from the IMF and from donor and creditor countries; the extent to
which the immediate foreign-exchange position was unusually precarious; and
the significance of perceptions of inefficiencies due to foreign-sector policies.
IMF PRESSURE.
The IMF in particular repeatedly has advocated reform and liberalization
of Chilean international economic regimes. The policies prescribed by the IMF
comprise what is known as the "monetarist" position in the "structuralist-T
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debate referred to a number of times above. Pinto [19601 and
others have criticized the 1956—58 attempt because they claim it followed the
IMF prescription, with the result being "neither stability, nor development."
Pressure from the IMF and donor and creditor countries apparently was
considerable in the mid-1950s. For the 1952—55 subphase net capital inflows
to the central government and net IMP credit both dropped substantially in
comparison with the previous subphase (lines 13 and 15.1 in Table 8.1). Be-
fore the 1965—70 attempt, significant pressures, at least implicitly, were applied
from abroad because Chile sought foreign cooperation in the debt rescheduling
of 1965. The decline in the net credit from the IMF in the years immediately
before the Frei liberalization also may indicate more direct pressure (line 15.1
in Table 8.1).
For the first and, to a smaller extent, the third liberalization episodes,
therefore, outside official pressure provided an impetus for liberalization. Be-
fore the second attempt, there is no evidence of unusual foreign pressure, nor
of a decline in net inflows from official sources (lines 13 and 15.1 in Table
8.1). Even before the third effort, moreover, a large increase in the net inflow
to the government much more than offset the above-mentioried fall in IMF
credit. Thus, the importance of foreign official pressure in the initiation of these
liberalization attempts should not be overemphasized.
It should be pointed out, nevertheless, that the identification of the 1956—
58 attempt in particular with foreign interests discredited this program in the
eyes of many Chileans. In part the identification was with official foreign agen-
cies, especially the IMP. Much more of this identification, however, was
associated with Klein-Saks, a Washington-based private consulting firm hired
by the Ibañez government. Hirschman [1963] claims that the presence of the
Klein-Saks mission probably facilitated the rapid acceptance of policies largely
suggested previously by the Central Bank and former ministers of finance
Felipe Herrera and Jorge Pratt. He also maintains, however, that the inter-
mediary role employed by this mission enabled the major political groups in
Chile to avoid direct confrontation over the basic issues. Fundamental prob-
lems were covered up, but not resolved. Subsequent criticisms of the over-all
program, moreover, have been directed in large part toward Klein-Saks. The
net result has been an overemphasis on the role this mission actually played,
and further avoidance of the basic underlying issues.3
FOREIGN-EXCHANGE SHORTAGES.
Before the second and third attempts, the immediate foreign-exchange
shortages were severe. The deficits on current account were quite large, and
net foreign reserves were very low (columns 3 and 6 for lines 8.1 and 9 in
Table 13.1). Capital flight through overinvoicing of imports apparently was
extensive (line 7.1 in Table 13.1). In the third case, moreover, the previouslyRECENT LIBERALIZATION EPISODES 299
noted large debt repayment obligations added further claims on the limited
supply of foreign exchange. For both of these efforts, therefore, a substantial
immediate foreign-exchange crisis added to the pressure for a change in the
• international economic regime.
Before the first attempt, in contrast, the role of an immediate foreign-
exchange crisis was much less. True, substantial capital flight was occurring
(column I for lines 3 and 7.1 in Table 13.1). But the surplus on current ac-
• count actually was quite large and net foreign reserves were relatively high
(lines 8.1 and 9).
ly In the third episode, moreover, the immediate reaction to the initial
1 foreign-exchange crisis included some increase in restrictions, e.g., the import
application rejection procedure of 1965 described in subsection 4.1.2. In that
case, in fact, foreign-sector liberalization accelerated over the phase. One
factor in this intensification was the concentration of the efforts of a number
of talented individuals in the Central Bank on reforming the foreign sector
after hopes for the reforms in other areas had been frustrated. Of very substan-
tial importance, however, was the improvement in Chile's foreign-exchange
position over the phase, which was largely due to the booming international
copper market.
Thus, immediate foreign-exchange crises were a motivating factor in the
•5,.. secondand third liberalization efforts, but not in the first. Once the liberaliza-
tion program commenced, subsequent intraphase changes generally reflected a
direct rather than an inverse association between liberalization and the avail-
as ability of foreign exchange.
INEFFICIENCIES OF FOREIGN-SECTOR POLICIES.
—]y Many of the distortions and income effects of restrictive Chilean inter-
national economic regimes are analyzed in Chapters 5, 10, and 11. Although it
• isvery difficult to specify the exact importance of the regimes, apparently the
perception of a number of their negative effects on certain areas of the economy
partially underlay the desire for liberalization among an important group of
p.11 Chilean technicians and businessmen. Specific perceived shortcomings included
extreme instability, large windfall gains, corruption, disincentives for invest- P
ii, ment and for exports, whose foreign-exchange proceeds paid for imported
• investment goods, inefficient resource allocation, preferences in import quotas
granted to large firms, overdependence on imported inputs, delays, arbitrariness
• of operation, and large personal economic rewards—not for increasing pro-
ductivity, but for obtaining better NERs, larger quotas, or correctly anticipating
massive devaluations.300 THREELIBERALIZATION EPISODES
13.1.2Internal Factors.
The external situation had some importance in the motivation for each
of the three liberalization episodes. Of much greater significance, however, was
the internal situation, two of its characteristics in particular:
i. In all three cases liberalization of the foreign sector was not the domi-
nant goal in itself. Instead it was but one component of an over-all stabilization
program. The primary motives were to reduce inflation and to increase capacity
utilization. In the year immediately preceding the commencement of each of
the efforts the rates of inflation were, respectively, 76, 26, and 47 per cent
(line 10 in Table 13.1). In each case inflation was accelerating.4 Capacity-
utilization rates also were low, although less so in the second case (line 11 in
Table 13.1). These internal concerns predominated among the motives for
the three efforts.
ii. In an immediate sense, all three efforts also were the result of new
programs that followed substantial political shifts.5 In the first case, the internal
political and economic conditions had deteriorated so much that complete
breakdown of the political and economic systems seemed imminent. That threat
induced the formation of an informal coalition among Ibanistas, Conservatives,
and Liberals with the help and guidance of the new finance minister, Oscar
Herrera (not to be confused with Felipe Herrera, mentioned earlier), and
the Klein-Saks mission. This new grouping broke a long-existing parlia-
mentary stalemate and legislated the 1956—58 program of stabilization with
liberalization.
In the other two cases the nature of the political shift was mor'e obvious.
Presidential elections caused changes in the government. In late 1958 Ales-
sandri won the election, and in late 1964 Frei was elected to succeed him. In
both cases the new governments, counting somewhat on their initial political
momentum, soon tried to initiate major programs of stabilization with liberal-
ization.
At times discussions of liberalization of the foreign sector are written as if
all internal motives and policies were but adjuncts to the primary concern with
the international sector. Such a view does not reflect the reality of the Chilean
political economy. The basic causes of liberalization efforts generally have been
internal factors. Foreign repayment obligations, speculation against the cur-
rency, capital flight, and donor- and creditor-country pressures have all been
• significant, but less important than internal concerns. Foreign-sector policy
• generally has been much more an appendage of domestic policy, albeit an
important appendage, rather than vice versa. -
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13.2 WHAT WAS DONE
Details of the changes in the components of the international economic regime
included in the liberalization packages were given in Chapters 3 and 4. Here
four major characteristics of the programs are summarized: the net or effective
devaluation, the changes in import premiums and in EERs for the different
categories, related monetary and fiscal policies, and the size and impact of
•
official foreign credits.
13.2.1Net Devaluations.
• The liberalization packages all included substantial initial nominal devalu-
ations. In the first year the weighted average of all NERs changed, respectively,
by 94, 47, and 34 per cent (line 13 in Table A.7). Prima facie, these appear
to be large devaluations. However, two factors are not taken account of in these
• figures. First, given the extent and duration of the Chilean inflation, some de-
flation of the NERs is necessary. In the first year of each episode, the respective
changes in the PLD-NERs were only 22.5, 4.3, and 4.4 per cent (column 13
in Table 3.2). Second, at the same time that the nominal devaluations oc-
curred, other changes were being made in the international economic regime.
The net impact of these other changes was to lessen price and quantitative
trade barriers. The PLD-EERs changed by 24.8, 5.5, and 5.5 per cent
(column 1 in Table 5.1 or line 1 in Table 13.1). Therefore, the initial net de-
valuations were somewhat larger than an examination of PLD-NERs alone
would indicate, but much smaller than examination of NERs or EERs alone
would suggest.
After the first year, the patterns of changes in the PLD-EERs varied sub-
stantially in the three liberalization attempts (column 1 in Table 5.1). In the
first episode, the weighted average rose 35 per cent in the second year, but fell
11 per centin the third year. In the second attempt a constant NER was main-
tained as a symbol of price stability. Therefore, the PLD-EER dropped 7.6
and 5.6 per cent, respectively, in the second and third years. In the third pro-
gram a sliding-peg NER policy was adopted. Nevertheless, the PLD-EER fell
in four of the five subsequent years of the program by from 1.9 to 4.9 per cent.
The exception was a 3.0 per cent rise in 1968. The general tendency, therefore,
•V wasfor the PLD-EER to decline after the initial large devaluation. In only two
of the nine relevant years did it increase instead.
In all three cases, however, the really major problem with NER policy
was not the tendency to let PLD-EERs decline during the phase. The major
• problem was that initial devaluations were not sufficient to achieve equilibrium
(see Bacha and Taylor [1973:144] and line 1.1.1 in Table A.1 for two indices
1'302 THREE LIBERALIZATION EPISODES
of the extent of disequilibrium). The tendency for the PLD-EERs to fall only
exacerbated the situation. Given the responses of various items in the balance
of payments (see sections 6.2 and 7.2 and Chapter 8), the continued main-
tenance of below-equilibrium PLD-EERs guaranteed an eventual foreign.
exchange crisis or pressure to increase trade barriers in order to avert such a
crisis.
13.2.2Changes in Import Premiums and in Discrepancies in Effective
Exchange Rates.
The import premium rate fell substantially in the first year of the three
liberalizations—by 34, 20, and 17 per cent respectively (column 6 in Table
13.1 or column 4 in Table 5.1). There was a considerable immediate shift in
income per unit of imports, therefore, from the former recipients of import
privileges. During both the first and the third episodes, moreover, further de-
clines wde recorded. In a few years, these subsequent decreases were quite
large—Si per cent in 1957 and 17 per cent in 1968 (although increases of 9
per cent in the next two years partially offset the latter). During the second
effort, however, the premium increased 24 per cent after the first year with the
result that in the last year it was not significantly less than before the com-
mencement of that phase.
As is indicated by the data in Table 13.1, lines 2, 3, 4, and 5; Table 5.1,
column 3; and Table 5.2, columns 1 and 6, discrepancies among the EERs for
different categories of transactions also generally fell significantly with the
initiation of liberalization compared to the year preceding the effort. Quite
generally, therefore, distortions and differential incentives were cut—often
substantially—by the initiation of the liberalization efforts, with one important
exception, however, which was pointed out in subsection 5.1.2: discrimination
against agriculture increased in two of the cases and remained the same in the
third because the government tried to damp inflationary expectations by keep-
ing the rate of increase of food prices down.
After the first year of liberalization, many of these discrepancies widened
again. In 1956—58 this was true for the nonmerchandise-to-merchandise ratio,
the black-market to national accounts NERs, and (most strongly) the imports-
to-exports ratio. In 1959—61 differences grew for the nonmerchandise-to-
merchandise raito. In 1965—70 the same occurred for the first two indices but
not for the imports-to-exports ratio. As the liberalizations lost their initial
momentum, therefore, differential incentives and distortions commonly grew,
especially in the two cases in which the import premium rate tended to fall.
1
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13.2.3Related Fiscal and Monetary Policies.
As is emphasized in section 13.1, fiscal and monetary policies were not
basically subsidiary components of the foreign-sector liberalization programs.
To the contrary, the liberalization of the foreign sector was but one aspect of
the over-all stabilization effort. The major concern of the government in all
three stabilization episodes was to reduce inflationary pressures. In 1956—58
restrictive monetary policy reduced the rate of growth of the money supply
from 62 per cent in 1955 to 44, 35, and 28 per cent respectively in each of the
next three years. In the first year of the next effort, 1959—61, it increased
somewhat to 30 per cent, but thereafter fell to 23 and then to 26 per cent. In
the first year of the 1965—70 phase it increased to 54 per cent (as compared
to 40 per cent in 1964). In the next two years it declined to 46 and then to 22
per cent respectively, but thereafter increased to 36 per cent in 1968, to 42 per
• cent in 1969, and to 66 per cent in 1970. Except in the first attempt,
then, monetary policy was initially not all that restrictive. In the last two
efforts it subsequently became tighter, but then loosened near the end of each
phase.
In all three stabilization programs the government announced its intention
to reduce the size of the government deficit (line 12 in Table 13.1). In the
first year of the Ibañez-Klein-Saks program a cut of 15 per cent in real terms
was achieved. In the next two years and continuing through the Alessandri
r program, however, the size of the real government deficit increased steadily,
with annual increases of 53, 14, 26, 29, and 1 per cent. These governments
e wereable neither to reduce expenditures significantly nor to, reform the tax
system to make it more effective.
•— Inthe first year of the Frei period, once again the real government deficit
increased—this time by 18 per cent. Thereafter, however, it fell to a much
lower level. It dropped 23 per cent in 1966 and another 45 per cent in 1967,
and fluctuated around the resulting new lower levels for the rest of the phase.
The reasons for this change are twofold: the Frei government was much more
successful than its predecessors in implementing some effective internal tax
reforms; and the copper boom greatly increased real revenues from mining
and exports, in part because of the relatively high degree of participation of the
Chilean government in the returns (see subsection 4.2.1).
Not only the size of the government deficit is important. If aggregate de-.
mand has a role in the determination of output, the level of government ex-
penditure for a given deficit also is significant. in the first year of the Ibaiiez-
•. Klein-Saksprogram real government current expenditures were cut 3.7 per
cent as part of the stabilization effort. In the last two years of that program and
in all three years of the Alessandri effort expenditures increased (by0 6.7, 11.1,
• 1.6, 6.1, and 1.4 per cent, respectively). They rose 16.6 per cent in the first304 THREE LIBERALIZATION EPISODES
year of the Frei phase and 8.6 per cent in the second. In the third year they
declined imperceptibly, and therafter increased at moderate rates.
Except for the first year of the 1956—58 phase and the last two years of
the Frei program, thus, fiscal policy was fairly expansionary during the three
stabilization-liberalization episodes. The maintenance of expansionary policies
in the midst of anti-inflationary programs was due to difficulties in obtaining
and implementing fiscal reforms on the one hand and to the desire to limit
recessions on the other.
The over-all impact of monetary, fiscal, and other policies on inflation
had the same general pattern in each of the three episodes (line 10 in Table
13.1 and line 2.1 in Table A. 1). The annual rate of change of the GDP deflator
dropped substantially in the initial stages of the program. As political momen-
turn tailed off, however, discipline faltered and inflationary pressures once again
grew.
The total impact of such policies on capacity utilization and growth dif-
fered somewhat in the three episodes (lines 11 and 15 in Table 13.1 and lines
2.2 and 5.1 in Table A. 1). The first two programs were characterized by an
initial drop in both capacity utilization and over-all growth, followed by an
increase and then a decline as the effort fizzled out. The Frei period had high
capacity-utilization rates and growth in the first two years (e.g., per capita GDP
increased by 4.8 and 9.0 per cent respectively in 1965 and 1966), followed by
relative stagnation.
13.2.4Size and Impact of Official Foreign Credits.
Average annual net inflows to the central government and central insti-
tutions in millions of 1958 dollars increased from 2.3 in 1952—55 to 16.7 in
1956—58 and to 52.6 in 1959—61 (line 13 plus line 15 in Table 8.1). In the
first two liberalizations the increased supplies from imports made possible by
• these larger net inflows aided substantially in the reduction of inflationary pres-
sures. These increases did not occur, however, in the first year of these pro-
grams. Instead, they were recorded in the second and third years as the
government attempted to salvage the effort by using enlarged foreign debt to
provide purchasing power. When additional foreign credits became difficult to
obtain—especially in late 1961—the programs collapsed.
For the Frei attempt the pattern was reversed. The net inflow in millions
of 1958 dollars increased from 81.8 in 1964 to 135.3 in 1965, but the average
annual level declined from 106.9 in 1962—64 to 64.3 in 1965—69. As is noted
in section 8.2, the drop in the mean inflow primarily reflected a drop in foreign-
exchange needs because of enlarged revenues generated by the copper boom
of the late 1960s.
c
In all three cases, then, net inflows of official foreign credits played im-
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portant short-run roles. In the first two programs they allowed the liberalization
efforts to be prolonged. In the third they helped it to get started. In no case,
however, did they lead to long-run success. In the long run, in fact, they may
have been dysfunctional by obscuring the fact that the exchange rate remained
well below equilibrium.
13.3 SHORT-RUN EFFECTS OF
n LIBERALIZATION
The long-run advantages of liberalization as they relate to four areas of Chilean
macroeconomic policy—foreign-exchange position, resource allocation, in-
come distribution, and development—were taken up in earlier chapters. But
whether or not a liberalization prevails long enough for those advantages to be
realized depends in considerable part on the short-run impact of those policies.
Consequently, the latter question, also, has been taken up in detail, and the
issues are summarized in this section.
p 13.3.1Foreign-Exchange Position.
y A wide variety of responses of components of the balance of payments to
liberalization and devaluation are detailed in chapters 6, 7, and 8. Speculative
inventory holding and capital flight fell. Extralegal flows declined. Exports,
especially of a nontraditional nature, and net direct investment inflows in-
creased. Desired imports tended to drop due to higher PLD-EERs, but actual
imports tended to rise significantly because there were fewer quantitative
-U restrictions. (The latter situation particularly characterized capital goods
imports.)
Y On a general-equilibrium level many substantial partial-equilibrium direct
responses were largely offset by indirect effects, especially those transmitted
through the nexus of foreign exchange, money, and prices. The general-
e equilibriumresponse to a devaluation alone, therefore, was not large. More-
0 over, since devaluation was not sufficient to reach equilibrium levels and since P
o the PLD-EERS tended to decline during the more liberal phases, pressure on
foreign exchange was increased. In addition, the import responses to reduced
quantitative restrictions were substantial.
The net result of all of these factors included rather substantial deficits on
current account in all three attempts (line 8.1 in Table 13.1 and line A in
Table 8.1). In the first two efforts the mean annual deficit in constant dollars
rose significantly over that for the previous phase. In all three cases these
• deficits tended to increase during the phase—in part because of the declining
PLD-EERs for imports (line 1 in Table 13.1 or column 1 in Table 5.1 ).6
f
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creasing differentials between the PLD-EERs for imports and for exports
exacerbated the problem in the 1956—58 and 1959—61 phases (line 5 in
Table 13.1).
The pressure on foreign exchange, therefore, was great and growing. In
1965—70 the copper boom and the large net capital inflows relieved this pres-
sure. In the earlier attempts the net official inflows provided transitory relief
(see subsection 13.2.4). When funds from these sources became less readily
available or dried up, the government had to alter the international economic
regimes. It chose to abandon the liberalization attempt, gradually in the first
case and quite abruptly in the second. In neither case did it first increase the
PLD-EER for imports or reduce the discrimination against exports. In 1958
the Thaiiez government did not consider such alternatives because the whole
political situation had so disintegrated that only piecemeal, ad hoc measures
could be applied. In 1961 the Alessandri government did not pursue them be-
cause a fixed NER was an important symbol, if not the cornerstone, of the price
stabilization effort.
13.3.2Cyclical Fluctuations in Nominal and Real Terms.
Within a general-equilibrium context, devaluation alone led to substantial
immediate inflationary pressure. This part of the stabilization-liberalization
package thus worked strongly against initial price stability. in quan-
titative restrictions, however, had the opposite effect. As long as sufficient for-
eign exchange was available to finance increased imports, reductions in restric-
tions led to increased supplies and lower inflationary pressure.
In the 1959—6 1 program, this method was used to reduce inflation to the
lowest level since the Second World War. The GDP deflator increased only'
9.5 per cent in 1960 and 7.9 per cent in 1961. A fixed NER, as is noted above,
also was utilized as a symbol of stability in order to damp inflationary expecta-
tions. Shortly after the foreign-exchange crisis of late 1961, quantitative re-
strictions were intensified and the fixed NER was abandoned. Inflation acceler-
ated rapidly.
The short-run impact of both devaluation and liberalization on output
was negative. Increased competition from imports more than offset the greater
availability of imported inputs. This effect could have been lessened by lowering
trade barriers immediately on noncompetitive imports and only more slowly
on competitive imports. To do so, however, would have left many inefficient
industries with even greater effective protection. It also might have made the
• whole liberalization attempt seem less credible.
Another possibility would have been to use fiscal and monetary policy to
• offset the contractionary impetus of liberalization. This was done in 1965 and
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sures. In the Frei program the government tried to increase capacity utilization
p and growth by expansionary fiscal and monetary policy limited by a pro-
grammed decline in the rate of inflation. The latter, it was hoped, would reduce
inflationary expectations despite the booming economy. There was initial suc-
cess, but momentum could not be maintained for more than a year or two.
Thereafter, both inflation and stagnation again became more troublesome.
y
13.3.3Resource Allocation and Structural Change.
The effect of liberalization on resource allocation among sectors and
subsectors is detailed in Chapter 10. Agriculture and the more modern and
intermediate-goods-oriented manufacturing subsectors were particularly re-
sponsive to liberalizations. Mining also responded positively. The more tradi-
tional and consumer-oriented manufacturing subsectors, in contrast, generally
were unable to meet the increased competition of the liberalized flow of imports.
The pattern of response poses a dilemma for the government. On the one
hand, the short- and medium-run costs of diverting resources from some of the
long-protected traditional industries are quite high. These costs are not only
1 economicbut political as well, because some of these subsectors have acquired
considerable political power. On the other hand, in the absence of foreign
competition the same industries have shown little tendency to become efficient.
1- Continued protection apparently would entail incurring a number of the costs
described earlier without promoting substantial development. Moreover, it
would further reinforce those who already have vested interests in a restrictive
e system.
Perhaps some gradual reduction in protection with interim aid in reallo-
cating resources would provide a solution. Given past experience, however,
any proposal for gradual adjustment might not be credible. Rather than
cooperate, the affected industries might see their own interests to be in intensive
lobbying for reinstitution of high EPRs.
It 13.3.4Distribution of Control over Income and Resources.
p
g As detailed in Chapter 11, the consequences of liberalization for the van-
ous elements of control over income and resources have been complex and
it often dependent upon the time period under consideration. In the short run,
C liberalization and devaluation had a negative impact on the income going to
labor,7 traders who received the import premium, the owners of factors in
0 heavilyprotected industrial subsectors, the bureaucrats who ran the system,
and domestic, as opposed to foreign, factor owners. The effect on the split be-
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weight of devaluation versus a reduction in restrictions, with the government
being favored the more there were reductions in restrictions.
Some very strong or very important groups, thus, were adversely affected
in the short run by liberalization. One can always conceive of partial liberaliza-
tions or subsidies which would mitigate these effects. Too much emphasis on
the former would hamstring the whole effort. Adoption of explicit subsidies
would lessen distortions and make the transfers more explicit and, it would be
hoped, more responsive to the general political will. Given the problems in
fiscal reforms, however, subsidies, also, involve significant costs.
13.3.5Economic Growth.
The impact of liberalizations on economic growth is detailed in Chapter
12. In the short run, of course, there was very little effect on the over-all ca-
pacity of the economy. Because of induced changes in capacity utilization,
however, measured real GDP per capita changed. That it declined by —1.3 and
—2.0 per cent, respectively, in the first year of the first two stabilization-
liberalization programs caused critics to cry out in alarm (line 15 in Table
13.1). At the start of the Frei program, therefore, the government followed
more expansionary policies to avoid the same outcome. The effort was re-
warded by a growth rate of real per capita GDP of 4.8 per cent in 1965, fol-
lowed by a rate almost twice as high in 1966.
13.4 WHY LIBERALIZATION FAILED
AU three of the liberalization efforts failed. The same general factors underlay
the lack of success, but with different relative weights in different episodes.
The end of the Ibaflez-Klein-Saks effort formally was signaled by the
presidential election of late 1958. Effectively, however, this program had fal-
tered long before the election. The basic problem was a lack of sufficient short-
run success in the over-all stabilization program to allow the maintenance of
political momentum. Inflation had been reduced significantly, but still was
quite high and was accelerating again in 1958. Significant positive growth in
real per capita income had been obtained only in one year of the program, and
the growth rate was declining in 1958. Parliament refused to pass basic tax re-
form legislation. Rumors of graft and corruption increased, especially regard-
ing the operation of the special regime in the department of Arica. Students
demonstrating against increases in bus fares clashed with troops, and 18 deaths
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caused relatively rapid increases in food prices. Government fiscal-deficit
problems were not solved. By the time of the 1958 departure of Klein-Saks, the
government had lost control of the situation.
The failure of foreign-sector liberalization accompanied the failure of
stabilization. The foreign-sector situation was exacerbated, moreover, by grow-
ing foreign-exchange shortages. These shortages, in turn, partially originated
in excess demand due to the falling PLD-EER. Government reluctance after
mid-1957 to keep up with the internal inflation had its toll. The drop in the
world price of copper after 1956 further aggravated the foreign-exchange
shortage.
The end of the Alessandri liberalization also reflected insufficient short-
run success. The rate of increase in the GDP deflator had fallen to the lowest
level since the end of the Second World War, but the average rate of growth
of real product also had dropped to the lowest level since 1955. Despite some
success in fiscal reform, the government deficit increased to all-time highs.
In an immediate sense, however, the termination of this phase was almost
entirely due to a balance-of-payments crisis. Foreign-exchange reserves and
the national foreign credit standing were exhausted because of failure to control
the government deficit and because a substantially overvalued NER, with its
overvaluation steadily increasing, was being maintained side by side with a
liberal trade regime. The public-sector debt in foreign currency bad increased
101 per cent to a level of $788 million by the end of the phase. Total Chilean
debt in foreign currency (not including direct private credits or deferred pay-
ment import credits for which data are unavailable) increased 81.7 per cent to
a level of $954 million, equal to 183 per cent of exports or 22 per cent of GDP
(at the official exchange rate) in 1961. Net international reserves held by the
banking system plummeted to a new low of —$164 million at the end of 1961.
In December 1961 the Central Bank liquid reserves were down to the equiva-
• lent of approximately ten days of imports. A considerable number of import
• applications were still pending. The Central Bank could not borrow further
from abroad because of the substantial foreign debt. On December 27, 1961,
the Central Bank revoked all authority to deal in foreign exchange and estab-
lished prohibitive 10,000 per cent prior deposits on all imports. Thus, the
Phase IV period and the internal stabilization program ended.8
The Frei government had the advantage of hindsight about the two pre-
vious failures. Therefore, it adopted a strategy with two major components: a
programmed decline in the inflation rate over several years so that inflationary
expectations could be lowered but a recession averted and a sliding-peg NER
policy in which the PLD-EER would be increased over time to its equilibrium
value.
In 1965 and 1966 success was fairly general. Inflation was cut signifi-
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cantly, and growth was quite high. The PLD-EER declined, however, despite
the intent of the sliding-peg policy.
In 1967 considerable internal political cohesion was dissipated in an
abortive attempt to introduce a compulsory savings plan for 1968 wage in-
creases exceeding 10 per cent and to suspend the right to strike. In reaction to
these proposals a general strike was called in December 1967, the political
parties of the left coalesced against the government, and political support from
the right also declined in opposition to the features of the program which would
limit the freedom of business and in opposition to other government programs
such as agrarian reform. Several ministers of finance resigned in succession,
and the government proposal was defeated after months of acrimonious debate.
With that failure, stabilization efforts faltered considerably. In this instance,
however, foreign-sector liberalization was not abandoned. If anything, it was
intensified.9 The reasons for this were twofold. (i) The copper boom of the
late 1960s led to an immediate relaxation of the foreign-exchange constraint.
Because of this boom the mean United States producer price for copper ex-
ceeded that in the previous phase by 39 per cent, the mean IME copper price
exceeded that in the previous phase by 77 per cent, and the Chilean terms of
trade improved substantially. (ii) A number of skilled Chilean economists in
the government, once their efforts at internal reform had petered out, turned
their attention to reforming the international economic regime.
Despite the expanded emphasis on liberalization of the foreign sector, the
PLD-EER was very low and declining (except for a slight rise in 1968).
Nevertheless, revenues from copper were sufficient to avert an immediate
foreign-exchange crisis.10 This phase was brought to an end, instead, by the
election of the Allende government in late 1970. The earlier failure of stabiliza-
tion, of course, probably was an important factor in the election outcome.
Thus, Chile has had at least one abrupt stabilization-liberalization effort
which failed because the short-run success of the effort was insufficient to main-
tain political momentum. It also has had one gradual attempt which failed in
part because the short-run success could not be maintained for a long enough
time to generate stability. It has always attempted to liberalize with a below-
equilibrium and often declining PLD-EER.
To increase the probability of reaping the long-run benefits of successful
liberalization, one obvious prescription is to draw the PLD-EER much closer
to its equilibrium level and prevent it from declining under the pressure of infla-
tion. When sufficient political momentum exists to attempt another liberaliza-
tion, moreover, an abrupt change would seem preferable to a more gradual one.
The sudden alteration would have short-run costs, some of which could be
mitigated by transitory subsidies. But it might make it possible to change
underlying expectations before political momentum was lost, so that some of
the longer-run benefits would begin to appear. Given three liberalization and
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four stabilization failures in less than two decades, cynicism about the proba-
bility of success of any gradual attempt is liable to kill it before longer-run
benefits appear.
NOTES
1. This point is not in conflict with the second point above. The latter refers to
past efforts, while this one refers to any future attempts, given the past failures.
2, As is discussed in Chapter 12 and other segments of Part III, however, the em-
pirical foundation which the Chilean experience provides for expectations of large long-
run benefits is weak. To argue strongly for these long-run benefits one must rely on
analogies with the experience of other countries, such as Brazil.
• 3. The existence of foreign scapegoats, in other words, allowed a superficial con-
sensus without a basic agreement on the sacrifices required of the type which Sturc
r [1967:2161has emphasized.
4. The 1958 rate of inflation was below that for 1957, but it accelerated during 1958.
5. It is always possible to ask whether or not economic conditions caused the political
e shifts. In fact, their contribution seems to have been considerable. But in an immediate
sense these political changes were important in themselves.
6. The PLD-EER for 1958 exceeded that for 1956. but was less than that for 1957.
7. The wage share of GDP rose in the first year of the Ibaflez-Klein-Saks program,
U butfell during the phase. It fell substantially in the first year of the Alessandri effort
and recovered only partially during the phase. It remained the same in the first year of
e the Frei episode and increased slowly thereafter (line 14 in Table 13.1). This share, of
course, was affected by all policies—not only foreign-sector ones.
e 8. Although anticipated in some quarters, these events were not foreseen by all
observers. For example, apparently late in1961 Hirschman [1963:220] approved the
e appointment of Luis Escobar (a representative of the structuralist school who had been
dean of the Faculty of Economics at the University of Chile) as Minister of Economics
in August 1961. He also noted that the government had a majority in both houses and
- hadthe assurance of long-run assistance from the Alliance for Progress. He concluded:
•- "Hence,the chances for improving the performance of the Chilean economy in various
• structural ways while keeping the traditional scourge [i.e., inflation] under control looked
more promising than they had for a long time."
h 9. Rather extensive plans to further liberalize the tariff and the whole trade system
in order to encourage more domestic efficiency were later discussed in Banco Central
[1970b:463—467], but because of the subsequent political events these plans were never
a carriedout.
p
10. At the end of this phase the banking system had the highest level of net in-
ternational reserves in more than two decades. At the same time, the foreign debt totaled
close to $3 billion. As a proportion of annual export value it had fallen somewhat to
248 per cent. Relative to GDP it had dropped to 27.2 per cent. Nevertheless, these debt
obligations remained very large and constrained the new Allende government.
- -. •-
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